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STATE OF MIND IN CIVIL CASES
CHARLES CLAFLIN ALLENt
The state of mind of a party is often an important element in deter-
mining his guilt, his liability, or the effectiveness of his tr-ansfers or
other acts affecting his property. Since problems concerning state of
mind pervade the great majority of the branches of the law and cut
across nearly all of them, the field is of tremendous scope-much too
great for detailed examination in one article. Nevertheless there is a
relatively small number of principles running through the cases deal-
ing with the problem. This article will attempt to discuss the main
principles concerning the legal effect of different states of mind and
will include a brief study of specific applications of these principles to
a fev fields of the law of torts, including slander and libel, malicious
prosecution, fraud and deceit and the question of liability for punitive
damages, and will also consider state of mind as an element in fraud-
ulent conveyances.
This discussion will be confined, however, to normal states of mind
and will not include states of mind created by insanity or other mental
incapacity, or the effect of duress upon an otherwise normal mind.
Although illustrative criminal cases will be referred to, no detailed
examination will be made of state of mind as affecting criminal re-
sponsibility, where state of mind is usually specifically involved; not
because it is not an important area but because it is a specialized field
of more limited application than the great body of civil cases. In the
field of taxation also, while illustrative cases will be referred to, no
attempt will be made to make a detailed study of the application of
states of mind to tax liability.
I. DEFINITION OF TERMS
The words "state of mind" have been used to describe all types of
normal mental states wherever significant in the law. The words
which designate these different states of mind vary with different
fields of the law. In the law of torts a word in very common use is
"malice"; the law of fraud and deceit uses the word "scienter"; in the
law of fraudulent conveyances the statute speaks of "intent to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors." In the criminal law the courts speak of
"criminal intent," which covers various types of general or specific
intent required to constitute the particular crime. In the field of tax-
ation, several cases of specific intent are referred to as a basis of tax
liability, for example, contemplation of death in the case of inter vivos
Senior Paitner, Allen & Allen.
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gifts. In fact there is a tendency on the part of the courts to examine
transactions to determine whether the true intention of the parties is
to do what they appear to do formally, and whether the tax conse-
quences are different.
Many decisions use the words "malice," "intent," "purpose," and
"motive" without defining their exact meaning; this gives rise to
much of the difficulty in reconciling cases. True conflicts among the
cases are not too common if the real meaning of the courts in the use
of the words chosen is analyzed and understood. In this field, as in-
deed in every field of speech and writing, the exact meaning of words
necessarily varies with the context. As the late Mr. Justice Holmes
said in the case of Towne v. Eisner,
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the
skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and con-
tent according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used.:
It will be particularly helpful to consider the meaning of the words
"intent," "purpose" and "motive." First and most important is the
word "intent." Associated and sometimes confused with this word
are the words "purpose" and "motive." The three words mean differ-
ent things, although "purpose" and "motive" frequently blend into
each other and are sometimes hard to distinguish. Intent means sim-
ply the volition or willingness to do an act. The only essential element
of an intentional doing of an act is that the doer do it knowingly or
willingly. Purpose, however, is the result sought, while motive is the
subjective reason for doing the act.2 To take a simple example, A,
after learning that B has been attentive to A's wife, meets B on the
street, walks up to him and strikes him in the jaw with his fist,
knocking him down. The blow was intentional; he intended to hit
him. His purpose was to cause him pain, humiliation and injury.
His motive was revenge.
In considering the legal consequences of these three states of mind,
the important rule in the field of intentional torts is that ordinarily
motive or purpose is not essential-only intent. The intentional doing
of a wrongful act without legal justification or excuse is actionable
although done without either bad motive or purpose to injure. That
is the principal rule of tort liability so far as concerns state of mind,
and is the rule in Missouri.3
This does not mean, of course, that evidence of motive or purpose,
or lack of evil motive or evil purpose, is not admissible. Such evidence
will always be relevant if punitive damages are sought and will usu-
1. 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
2. 52 AM. JuR., Torts § 5 at 363 (1944).
3. McDonald v. R. L. Polk & Co., 346 Mo. 615, 142 S.W.2d 635 (1940) ; Boehm
v. Western Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. App. 1942).
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ally be relevant for the jury to consider on the merits, although lack
of evidence of evil motive or purpose will not take the case from the
jury.
The converse of this proposition is also true, namely that a lawful
act is not made actionable by reason of motive or intent to injure.
This rule was established by the leading case of Allen v. Flood.4 In
that, case forty boilermakers, members of the Boilermakers Union,
were cmployed in repairing a ship at their employer's dock. They
,kjected to the employment of two shipwrights who were engaged by
the employer in repairing the woodwork of the same ship. The
boilermakers discovered that these shipwrights had been employed
by another firm in doing iron work on another ship. Allen, the busi-
nvss agent of the boilermakers, induced the employer to discharge
the shipwrights by threatening a strike of the boilermakers. Flood
and Taylor, the two shipwrights, brought suit against Allen for
!naliciously, wrongfully and with intent to injure the plaintiffs in-
ducing the employer to discharge them and to refuse to re-employ
them. The court held that since it appeared that the plaintiffs were
employ ed subject to discharge at the will of the employer, no action-
able wrong had been done them and that the coercion was not action-
able whatever might be the motive of the defendant, and that the
plaintifts could not recover, notwithstanding the jury's verdict.
Another example of the same rule is the erection of a spite fence
by a landowner upon his own land. This has generally been held not
to be actionable regardless of the motive behind its erection2
So also absolute privilege in slander and libel gives immunity from
liability no matter how evil the motive. For example, allegations in
a pleading which have any relevancy to the case are absolutely priv-
ileged and no liability is incurred by the plaintiff regardless of the
untruth of the allegations or the motive of the pleader6 This for the
obvious reason that there is an overriding public policy of the law
that parties to a law suit must be free of liability in respect of allega-
tions in the pleadings.
There are, however, a few cases where it has been held that acts
otherwise not unlawful are made actionable by a bad motive. One
of these rare cases, against the weight of authority, is Flaherty v.
Moran,' in which an injunction was granted to remove a fence erected
by a landowner on his own property where it served no useful purpose
but only satisfied the malicious ill-will of the owner against his
neighbor.
4. [1898] A.C. 1.
5. Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73,42 N.E. 765 (1896).
6. Laun v. Union Electric Co., 350 Mo. 572, 166 S.W.2d 1065 (1942).
7. 81 Mich. 52, 45 N.W. 381 (1890).
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It is the rule that emotional disturbance or mental anguish alone
is not actionable when not accompanied by physical contact or in-
jury;8 yet it is also well established in cases involving ejection of
passengers from railroad trains, that abusive and insulting language
when used in connection with the otherwise lawful conduct of the
conductor or brakeman will render the railroad liable even in the
absence of physical acts.9 Even in these cases, however, the malice
and ill-will must" be evidenced by verbal acts.
The foregoing definitions of intent, purpose and motive are not
always-or even often-followed by the courts. The word "intent"
is quite commonly used in the sense of purpose, as we have defined
it. It is common for the courts to speak of "intent to defraud" or
"intent to injure," meaning thereby not only that the act was volun-
tary but that the purpose was also bad. The Missouri statute avoid-
ing fraudulent conveyances speaks of an "intent to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors."'01 In the criminal law the word "intent" is com-
monly used in the sense in which we have used "purpose"; for ex-
ample, intent to kill, or intent to steal. However, in the civil cases
involving intentional torts and fraudulent conveyances, when con-
fronted with absence of evil purpose or ill-will, the courts say that
the absence of an intent to injure or an intent to defraud is no excuse
since every person is deemed to intend the consequences of his own
voluntary act. What they actually mean is that if the act is inten-
tional, the evil purpose is not essential.
Another famous word in the law of torts is "malice," which is used
with so many different meanings that confusion results unless its
various uses are understood. The word came from France with the
Norman Conquest and is derived from the mediaeval Latin malitia,
which in turn came from the Latin adjective malus, meaning bad or
evil, and it means, in plain English, malevolence and ill-will. No one
is in doubt as to its common meaning, but confusion comes from the
various meanings the courts have given it. The trouble has been that
"malice" is said to be an essential element of a number of torts such
as slander and libel and malicious prosecution. However, cases have
arisen and continue to arise in which the defendant has been guilty
of no actual ill-will at all and yet for reasons of legal policy the courts
have held him liable. But instead of re-defining the elements of the
cause of action in such cases so as not to require malice, the courts
have kept the old definition of the tort and have either given a differ-
ent meaning to malice, or have conclusively presumed malice. Courts
8. See PRossER, TORTS § 37, at 180 (2d ed. 1955).
9. Boling v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 189 Mo. 219, 88 S.W. 35 (1905); Smith v.
Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 122 Mo. App. 85, 97 S.W. 1007 (1906).
10. Mo. REV. STAT. § 428.020 (1949).
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are very reluctant to change the elements of a tort. It seems to be
more attractive to the judicial mind to change the meaning of the
word with the result that malice need no longer really be malicious;
today it usually means no more than intent-the intentional doing
of a wrongful act without just cause or legal excuse, and that is the
law in Missouri.,
However, the courts have endeavored from time to time to re-define
malice in order to describe its various meanings. Malice is said to
be either actual or implied, i.e., malice in fact or malice in law. Im-
plied or legal malice is a presumption from other facts; for example,
the publication of false and defamatory words which are libelous
per se- creates a conclusive presumption of malice."3
The phrase "actual" adds but little to the word "malice" since it
must include intent, but need not include motive or evil purpose. The
phrase "express malice" is sometimes used as requiring motive or
purpose to injure. It has become necessary to have some way of
expressing malice in its original and true sense, so the courts have
rephrased it by preceding it with the adjective "express."
The confusion in the cases as to the meaning of the word "malice"
is set out in the pithy opinion of the late Judge Goode, former dean
of the Washington University School of Law, in the case of Farley v.
Evening Chronicle Publishing Co.,14 a libel suit involving mistaken
identity. He writes in the opinion:
The theory of defense at this point opens into a field of con-
troversy as to how far the intention of the publisher of an
alleged libel to injure the particular plaintiff is material to the
latter's recovery, if in fact the publication was false and de-
famatory. This inquiry extends into a wider field, and one fruit-
ful in judicial disagreements regarding the necessity and in-
fluence of malice as an element of libel. The cases present subtle
and elusive phases of reasoning on this subject, and are so con-
flicting that the law of libel has been denounced as vague, fluc-
tuating, and incomprehensible.... Likely its uncertainty is due
11. Peak v. Taubman, 251 Mo. 390, 158 S.W. 656 (1913).
12. As used in the law of defamation, "per se" ordinarily has two meanings.
If the words on their face defame the plaintiff, they are defamatory "per se," and
the plaintiff need not plead an inducement, innuendo and colloquium. Words are
also said to be defamatory "per se" in those cases in which actual damage to the
plaintiff is conclusively piesumed and plaintiff is relieved of the burden of proving
special damages.
At common law, and in a majority of jurisdictions still, defamation "per se"
in the latter sense given above was applicable only to slander, since damages
were conclusively presumed in all libel cases. See PRossM, TORTS § 93 (2d ed.
1955). But in Missouri and a few other jurisdictions the two meanings have been
confused. One of the results of this confusion is that plaintiff now must prove
special damages even in case of a libel unless the words would have been slander
"per se" (in the second sense given above) at common law. See id. §§ 92, 93 at
582, 588; text supported by notes 24-27 infra.
13. Ex parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 157 S.W. 794 (1913).
14. 113 Mo. App. 216, 87 S.W. 565 (1905).
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to the retention by the courts of the doctrine that malice is
essential to a libel, more than to any other tort. The word
"malice" has been declared by an eminent jurist rarely to have
any meaning in law, except a misleading one. Justice Stephen,
as quoted in Newell, Slander & Libel (2d Ed.) p. 317. Anotherjudge has deplored the use of the word, and the maintenance of
the doctrine that malice is essential in cases like this . . . because
malice, though always insisted on in theory, is dispensed with
in every comprehensible sense. Only legal malice is exacted, and
on analysis this sinks into a myth or fiction, for so much malice
as is necessary to afford compensation for actual damage is in-
ferred from the fact that a false writing was published concern-
ing the plaintiff, although in truth the publisher felt no ill will,
and believed he was telling the truth. This result eliminates
malice from actions for libel, as a practical factor, save as a
reason for awarding more than compensative damages or over-
coming the defense of privileged communication. A libel is a
tort, and, generally speaking, neither the intention with which
a tort-feasor acted, nor the state of his feelings toward the per-
son injured or mankind at large, lessens his responsibility for
injuries actually caused by his wrongful act. He must make
recompense, although he was free from moral delinquency. Any
false and defamatory publication which is not privileged gives
rise to a case for damages sustained from it. This is true of
libel, notwithstanding the formula so often reiterated, that malice
is the gist of the action. The essential facts are the falsity of
the charge, and its publication and libelous nature. If true, no
degree of malice in the publisher will make it libel, nor, if false,
will rectitude of purpose exonerate him.1
These various meanings of the word malice as used by the courts
will be illustrated in the cases discussed under slander and libel,
malicious prosecution, and fraud and deceit.
II. PROOF OF STATE OF MIND GENERALLY
To taste the real flavor of the law on state of mind requires us to
nibble at some of the cases involving proof of mental states. The
layman naturally wonders how a state of mind can ever be proven
unless the party charged has talked too much. Fortunately, however,
it is frequently easier to tell a man's mind by what he does than by
what he says. "By their deeds ye shall know them." This is a fruitful
field for circumstantial evidence, and it is surprising how often the
circumstances bring conviction. Even a straw will show in which
direction the wind is blowing.
Of course declarations of the party; oral or written, are admissible
to show his intent and purpose unless self-serving. The case of Town,
send v. Schaden6 is an excellent illustration of this rule. An action
15. Id. at 226-27, 87 S.W. at 569.
16. 275 Mo. 227, 204 S.W. 1076 (1918).
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was brought against a decedent's estate to recover the value of certain
bonds claimed to have been given the plaintiff by defendant's intestate.
It seems during his life the intestate delivered certain bonds to his
sister, the plaintiff; he later got them back and had them in his pos-
session when he died, and the question was whether delivery of the
bonds to the plaintiff was with the intention of making a gift to her.
The court admitted in evidence letters from the deceased to his sister
and diary entries in his own hand indicating that the nature of the
transaction was that of gift. Afterwards, before his death, he wrote
certain other letters indicating that he had not given his sister the
bonds, but these letters were excluded as self-serving. The court held
that the declarations or the admissions of a donor as to his intention
are admissible to support an alleged gift but not to impeach his gift.
A party may testify in his own behalf as to his good-will and lack
of ill-will, where malice is an essential element, and the testimony is
material. Thus in Van. Sickles v. Brown,17 a malicious prosecution
suit, the court held that the defendant could testify that he acted in
good faith and had no ill feelings toward the plaintiff. A party to a
suit may always testify as to the intent with which he did an act when
it is material to the issues to determine what his intention was.
It will be noted that the court in the Van Sickles case used the word
"intent" in the sense in which we have used the words "purpose" and
"motive." viz., absence of evil purpose or motive. However, as we
have stated, in cases of this kind, while purpose and motive are ma-
terial, they are not essential.
In criminal cases the defendant may testify as to his intent where
specific criminal intent is an issue; but he may not testify as to a pur-
pose or motive which is not material. This is well illustrated by the
case of State v. Welch.- That was a case of felonious wounding. The
defendant had assaulted the prosecuting witness on the street. He had
unsuccessfully sought to prove by other witnesses prior improper re-
lations between the victim and the defendant's wife. He took the
stand in his own behalf and was permitted to testify that he did not
intend to kill the victim, but he was not permitted to testify that when
he struck him he intended only to punish him enough so he would let
his wife alone. This latter statement related to his purpose, which was
immaterial.
It is generally held that state of mind is not the subject of opinion
evidence. For example, in the case of Patrick v. Rice' the trustee in
bankruptcy sued to recover certain payments made by the bankrupt
within four months of bankruptcy and the question was the defen-
17. 68 Mo. 627 (1878).
18. 311 Mo. 476, 278 S.W. 755 (1925).
19. 98 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1938).
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dant's knowledge of the bankrupt's insolvency at the time of payment.
The court admitted in evidence the fact that several prior checks of
the bankrupt's had been dishonored, but the court did not permit the
witness to testify that the fact of non-payment of the prior checks
should create the belief in the payee's mind that the drawer was in-
solvent. So also in Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. v.
State,20 a suit for the wrongful death of a lineman who was electro-
cuted while working on a power line, the court excluded evidence of-
fered by the defendant that an experienced lineman would or should
know the dangers involved in working on a power line.
Another important method of proving a relevant mental state of
a party is by showing prior conduct inconsistent with his present con-
tentions. In Freeman v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,2 1 the Kansas
City Court of Appeals had a case of wrongful death as a result of a
street car running over the plaintiff's decedent. The court admitted
testimony disclosing that the motorman had claimed his constitutional
privilege and had refused to testify at the coroner's inquest; that an
attorney for the defendant had attended the inquest, had conferred
with the motorman and had advised him that it was the custom of the
company for an employee to stand on his constitutional rights when-
ever a death was involved; that the motorman told him he wanted to
abide by the custom and it was after this advice by the lawyer that
the motorman claimed his constitutional rights. The court said that
while the privilege against self-incrimination is absolute and cannot
be shown in any proceeding where the motorman is involved, yet un-
der the facts in evidence it appeared that the reason the motorman
stood on his constitutional rights was because it was the custom of
the defendant to have its employees do so. Standing on one's constitu-
tional rights because the evidence might tend to be incriminating is a
matter of personal choice in each case. The evidence showed, however,
that the lawyer had explained to the motorman, not his personal priv-
ilege, but the custom of the company and that the inference was plain
that the custom was for the purpose of suppressing evidence rather
than protecting the witness. The advice of counsel given to the motor-
man was tantamount to a direction by the defendant that the motor-
man claim his privilege in that case, the court reasoned, and in view
of this the testimony became admissible as an admission that the de-
fendant was conscious of being in the wrong and that its cause was
unjust.
It is well settled that extrajudicial admissions need not be made in
words; they may consist of non-verbal acts of the party. 22 The com-
20. 109 Md. 186, 72 Atl. 651 (1909).
21. 30 S.W.2d 176 (Mo. App. 1930).
22. Reiling v. Russell, 345 Mo. 517, 134 S.W.2d 33 (1939).
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monest and frequently the most successful method of proving state of
mind is by showing all the circumstances surrounding the transaction,
known as circumstantial evidence. The possible situations and vary-
ing circumstances are absolutely limitless; the circumstances may be
weak, or they may be very strong.
A tax case furnishes an excellent example. In Majestic Securities
Corp. v,. Comm'r , the taxpayer had purchased during the depression
a number of securities from a certain bank. The purchase price of
these securities was the bank's cost, although their market value had
severely declined during the depression. Later, the taxpayer sold the
securities at their then market value and sought to take as a loss the
difference between what it had paid for them and what it received, all
in accordance with the letter of the income tax law. However, the con-
trolling stockholders of the taxpayer were substantial stockholders,
and members of the family of stockholders, of the bank, although their
ownership of the taxpayer was not in the same proportion as their
ownership of stock in the bank. It also appeared that securities ac-
quired from other sources during the same period were all purchased
at the prevailing market price. The Commissioner determined that
the part of the amount paid to the bank above the market price of the
securities did not represent cost to the taxpayer but was paid for a
purpose other than acquiring them. The proof did not affirmatively
show what purpose the stockholders had in paying more than the
amount for which the securities could have been purchased on the
open market, nor did the proof show that the payment was in fulfill-
ment of any agreements previously made, nor that there was any
consideration for the excess. The court held that the Commissioner's
determination was correct; when the relation of the taxpayer's stock-
holders to the bank and their resulting interest in the bank's financial
condition were considered it was a reasonable inference that excess
payment was for the purpose of improving the condition of the bank
and that such excess did not represent a part of the cost.
A number of other cases involving circumstantial proof of state of
mind will appear under the various headings below.
III. SLANDER AND LIBEL
(a) The Requitenzent of Malice
The established definition of slander and libel is the malicious un-
privileged publication of false matter which is either defamatory per
se or is showm to be defamatory (per quod) .24 Malice has always been
23. 120 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1941).
24. "Per quod" is the phrase used to precede the portion of the declaration
alleging special damage in the old common law pleading. BLACK, LAW DIcTIoNARY
(4th ed. 1951). In this article it is used to designate those cases in which the
words are not defamatory "per se" under either definition given in note 12 supra.
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said to be an essential element of a cause of action for slander or
libel.2 5 What element of malice is required? As an essential element
of recovery, malice in the true sense of ill-will and evil purpose has
been substantially eliminated except in the case of qualified privilege,
where it is still required in theory-but even there it is often con-
siderably watered down.
In the first place, if the false matter is defamatory per se, malice is
conclusively presumed and no proof of it is required.2, If the matter
is shown to be defamatory (per quod), malice is sufficiently shown by
the intentional publication since malice in the legal sense is no more
than the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse and the jury need not find actual spite or ill-will. This is legal
malice. 27
Where the publication is qualifiedly privileged, we have a strong
vestige of the old rule that malice must be shown, and in such cases
the courts often refer to express malice or actual malice.2 11 Under a
plea of qualified privilege it is for the defendant to convince the court
that the privilege existed and then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show actual malice.2 9
But while actual malice is said to be required, it is not necessary
that personal ill-will be shown; the wanton disregard of the rights of
the party injured is sufficient to constitute malice. It is sufficient if
the purpose for which the statement was made was other than the
purpose for which the law confers the privilege, or is outside or be-
yond the limits of the privilege. Moreover, if the defendant was actu-
ated by an improper motive in making the defamatory utterance, he
is guilty of actual malice even though he erroneously believed the
statement to be true.30 Furthermore, the actual malice required to
overcome the defense of qualified privilege may be inferred from the
parties' relationship, from the circumstances attending the publica-
tion, from intemperate, reckless or violent language exceeding the
limits necessary to accomplish the privileged purpose, and even from
the falsity of the statement itself, together with other circumstances."1
And the court of appeals in Boehm v. Western Leather & Clothing
Co.,32 (involving qualified privilege) even approved an instruction
that malice does not consist alone of personal spite or ill-will, but
exists in law whenever a wrongful act is intentionally done without
25. 53 C.J.S., Libel & Slande'r § 166, at 261 (1948).
26. Ex parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 157 S.W. 794 (1934).
27. Sitts v. Daniel, 284 S.W. 857 (Mo. App. 1926); Boyce v. Wheeler, 197 Mo.
App. 295, 195 S.W. 84 (1917).
28. Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. App. 1942)
29. Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 229 Mo. App. 371, 80 S.W.2d 286 (1935):
30. Boehm v. Western Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. App. 1942).
31. Ibid.
32. 161 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. App. 1942).
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Just cause or excuse, the court stating that this was a correct defini-
tion of actual malice. But that is the definition of legal malice.33
It has been said that malice is an issue only where the words are
defamatory per quod and not per se, where qualified privilege is
claimed, where mitigation of damages is sought or where punitive
damages are sought. However, except in the case of qualified priv-
ilege, express malice is not required, although the lack of it may be
shown by the defendant in the above named situations.
The extent to which the cases have departed from the requirement
of malice used in any real sense is well illustrated by two types of
cases: first, the cases of mistaken identity; and second, the cases of
those who assist in a publication without knowledge of the defama-
tion. The rule, particularly in the case of newspapers and other pro-
fessional publishers, is that if the publication can be reasonably un-
derstood to refer to the plaintiff, and is so understood by those receiv-
ing the publication, it is immaterial that the defamer did not intend
to refer to him but did so either through mistake or perhaps without
knowledge of his existence. In Coats v. News Corp.,3" the defendant
newspaper publisher published an item concerning one Charles C.
Coats who had escaped from jail and in the course of his flight had
killed a highway patrolman. Defendant also published Coats' picture.
In the course of the article the paper referred to Coats as a former
ticket agent who had left a certain company under a shadow because
of his handling of funds. As a matter of fact, Charles C. Coats had
never been employed by the company as a ticket agent, but the plain-
tiff, whose name was Willis R. Coats, had been. Upon the mistake be-
ing called to the attention of the publishers, they apologized and pub-
lished a correction stating that the plaintiff was not the same person
who had been referred to in the article and had never been in any
trouble, but had an excellent reputation at all times. His picture was
also published under a headline-"A Clear Record." Nevertheless the
plaintiff brought suit for libel. The defendant requested a directed
verdict on the theory that the article was unambiguous and clearly
identified the person concerning whom it was written by his correct
name, photograph and parentage, and that the reference to his being
a former ticket agent was insufficient to identify the plaintiff as the
person intended. But the court held that if the communication was
reasonably understood by those who heard or read it as intending to
refer to the plaintiff, it was immaterial that the defamer did not in-
tend to refer to him. This principle is settled in the law of libel; but
what has happened to the requirement of malice? There was none
toward the plaintiff. We can only say that at least in cases of news-
:3:3 See text supported by note 27 supra.
:34. 355 Mo. 778, 197 S.W.2d 958 (1946).
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papeis and professional purveyors of news, malice is no longer re-
quired; the definition of malice as the intentional doing of a wrongful
act is not conditioned upon the doer intending to do any wrong.
Another example of the disappearance of the requirement of real
malice is the case of those who innocently assist in the publication.
The principal case on this subject in Missouri is McDonald v. R. L.
Polk & Co.35 In that case the defendant furnished to one Nulsenr a
mailing list of prominent people in St. Louis; in envelopes furnished
by Nulsen it enclosed and mailed for him a scurrilous, false and highly
defamatory circular concerning the plaintiff. There was only slight
evidence in that case that the defendant or any of its agents knew of
the contents of the circular,36 nor was plaintiff's recovery based upon
a finding of negligence in failing to ascertain its contents. The su-
preme court held that all persons who participate in the publication of
libelous matter are responsible and approved an instruction that if
the jury found the circular was libelous and the defendant published
it, they should find for the plaintiff even though they found that the
mailing of the circulars was a result of oversight or mistake without
any intention or purpose to injure the plaintiff.
The court relied upon the case of Sorenson v. Wood, which was a
suit for damages against a broadcasting company based on defama-
tory language concerning the plaintiff, broadcast in a political speech.
The defense was that the broadcasting company had no advance
knowledge of the contents of the speech. The trial court gave an in-
instruction telling the jury that the law of negligence and not of
defamation was the basis of liability of the broadcasting company.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed and remanded saying that
when one reads libelous words before the microphone with the consent
of the owner of the station, the user and the owner unite in the publi-
cation of the libel in the same manner in which a newspaper pub-
lisher and writer unite. There is liability in both cases, notwithstand-
ing due care and honest mistake.
The Missouri Supreme Court in the McDonald case discussed the
case of Becker v. Brinkop38 That was a suit for distributing a libelous
circular against an opposing candidate for ward committeewoman
in St. Louis. In the course of the opinion the court of appeals had
said that defendants would be liable only if it appeared that they were
aware that the circular was or probably might be libelous. If de-
fendants were wholly ignorant of the contents of the circular and had
35. 346 Mo. 615, 142 S.W.2d 635 (1940).
36. In the companion case of Edwards v. Nulsen, 347 Mo. 1077, 152 S.W.2d 28(1941), knowledge of the contents of the circular by defendant's agents was
shown at the trial.
37. 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1098 (1932).
38. 230 Mo. App. 871, 78 S.W.2d 538 (1935).
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no reason to suppose it contained libelous matter, they could not be
held liable because, the court reasoned, they had not consciously pub-
lished the libel. The supreme court in the McDonald case, without
passing on the soundness of the rule requiring conscious publication,
stated that it was not pertinent because such a rule should not be ap-
plicable to an advertising agency such as the defendant and that the
rules applicable to newspapers or broadcasting stations should apply."
The Restatement of Torts, section 577, states: "What constitutes
publication-Publication of defamatory matter is its communication
intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person de-
famed." (Emphasis added.) In the opinion of the authors of the
Resatcmient, a negligent act in connection with a communication may
be the source of liability. This, however, is a departure from the re-
(uirement of malice and even that departure does not seem to extend
as far as the law of Missouri. Assistance in the publication, even in-
nocently, creates liability-at least in the case of those engaged in
the business of publication.
The difficulty of the problems of libel in this modern world of ex-
panded communications is growing. The Federal Communications
Commission in 1948 rendered an opinion that the Political Broadcast
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934-prohibiting censor-
ship by the station-prohibits the refusal to broadcast a speech or
part of a speech by a candidate for public office because of its allegedly
libelous or slanderous content.", This opinion, and the authority of the
FCC to render it as a binding interpretation of the law, was denied by
Judge Hutcheson, in Houstor Post Co. v. United States. 41
(h C,, 4,nstantial Proo of Malice
A few examples of proof of malice by circumstantial evidence will
be of interest. In the Boei m case the president of defendant company
made a statement to a shop committee concerning the plaintiff, calling
her a crook and a thief. Plaintiff, an immigrant without much educa-
ton, had been employed by the defendant for about eight years and
was a skilled buttonhole operator. The shop was organized and the
employees were represented by shop committees to whom the company
was supposed to report any grievances. Plaintiff had two sisters, one
of whom was chairman of the shop committee. Plaintiff's mother was
a former employee and two years previously had had a claim against
::9. Criminal libel is defined as the malicious defamation of a person made pub-
hc by any printing, writing, etc. MO. REv. STAT. § 559.410 (1949). This section
has been held applicable to civil cases also. Hylsky v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co.,
348 Mo. 83, 152 S.W.2d 119 (1941). No opinion is here expressed as to the appli-
cability of the foregoing cases to prosecutions for criminal libel.
I0. Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (WHLS), 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
-1. 79 F. Supp. 199 (1948).
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the company arising out of a disability. After the mother's claim had
been made, the defendant's president began to criticize the plaintiff
and these disagreements with the plaintiff became worse after her
sister was elected chairman of the shop committee. The president
charged the sister with trying to run his business and he was over-
heard to say to a foreman that he would have to bring down the sister
and go after some of her relatives. At this time, a question arose
whether plaintiff had received excessive amounts of pay from the de-
fendant by false work tickets and the shop committee was called to-
gether. In the meantime the defendant had already advertised for
buttonhole operators who, at the conclusion of the meeting, were
given plaintiff's work. At the meeting defendant's president shouted
that the plaintiff was a thief, a crook and accused her of having stolen
from him for years. In fact he kept on repeating the statements for
half an hour.
All of these circumstances were held to be evidence of actual malice.
This is an excellent case on the facts to show the role of circumstantial
evidence in proving malice.
Other similar publications by the defendant are admissible except
those absolutely privileged. For example, in McGinnis v. Phillips,42
the defendant in the course of a trial of another suit had accused the
plaintiff of lying; after the trial he repeated the accusation on the
courthouse steps. In a suit for slander, based on the second accusa-
tion, plaintiff sought to prove the remarks made in the courtroom, but
they were excluded because absolutely privileged.
Other circumstances showing malice include: the fact that the state-
ment was volunteered; acts of the defendant trying to avoid suit;
agreements with other newspapers to suppress the fact that suit has
been filed; bad feeling between the parties; threats by defendant be-
fore and after publication; efforts to get the plaintiff indicted; refusal
to retract the statement; sending plaintiff a copy of the publication;
and either the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the statement-
in which case the statement is clearly malicious-or that no effort was
made to ascertain the truth.
On the other hand, any relevant circumstance may be used to rebut
malice, such as a lack of hostility evidenced by giving the entire con-
versation, or that reliable sources of information were relied upon, or
that libelous publications by the plaintiff preceded the one in suit
which is an answer to them. The defendant may testify also as to his
own feelings, intentions and sources of information.43
Even in cases of slander per se, the defendant may testify as to his
honest, though mistaken belief in the truth of his statements in miti-
42. 221 Mo. App. 702, 27 S.W.2d 467 (1930).
43. 53 C.J.S., Libel & Slander § 213 (1948).
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gation of damages. In Hall o. Adkins,- a landlord charged his farm
tenant with theft in removing corn on which the landowner had a lien.
Of course the plaintiff could not have been guilty of theft in removing
his own corn, but the defendant was permitted to testify in mitigation
of damages that he honestly though mistakenly believed it was theft.
(c) Conclusion
The law of malice in slander and libel is in need of restatement by
the courts in more modern and realistic language. It is sound law and
good policy to hold a newspaper responsible for publishing defama-
tory matter concerning the wrong man even though the result of a
mistake. It is sound to require advertising agencies to find out what
is in matter which they undertake to mail for their customers; but it
is unrealistic to call the offense libel if malice is the gist of the libel, or
even if it is an essential ingredient. It is sound law and good policy
to make actionable the publication of false matter which is defama-
tory per se. But it would help avoid confusion if liability were so
stated to be independent of malice rather than saying that malice is
an essential element of the tort but is conclusively presumed, since
often no actual malice is present.
IV. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
This tort has been defined as a previous unsuccessful civil or crim-
inal proceeding prosecuted by the defendant without probable cause
and with malice. Malice is said to be the gist of the action,2' but here
again, while malice includes a hostile, angry or vindictive motive, all
that is required is an intentional act in the furtherance of the prosecu-
tion with knowledge that it is without legal justification. Actual mal-
ice is not required .41
Where the prosecution is instituted for the purpose of collecting a
private debt, it is malicious in the legal sense.4 7 Nor is affirmative evi-
dence of either ill-will or an improper purpose essential to the recov-
ery. In Missouri if the prosecution is instituted without probable
cause, no other evidence of malice is required since malice may be in-
ferred from want of probable cause.4 8
However, there must be a finding of malice since both malice and
want of probable cause are essential to the recovery. The jury is not
44. 59 Mo. 144 (1875).
45. Ripley v. Bank of Skidmore, 355 Mo. 897, 198 S.W.2d 861 (1947).
46. Pritchett v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 228 Mo. App. 661, 73 S.W.2d 815(1934).
47. Ibid.
48. Randol v. Kline's Inc., 322 Mo. 746, 18 S.W.2d 500 (1929).
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required to find malice merely because it finds want of probable
cause.49
So while the law in theory requires malice and the instructions to
the jury must hypothecate the existence of malice as well as want of
probable cause, yet, since evidence of want of probable cause is suffi-
cient for a finding of malice, as a practical matter malice may be
found on slight evidence. Of course this is not the same as a conclu-
sive presumption of malice, but no additional affirmative proof of
malice is required. Furthermore, want of probable cause may be in-
ferred from an acquittal, and since malice may be inferred from want
of probable cause, we have that relatively rare case of an inference
upon an inferenceY' Usually the only safe advice that can be given a
client who wants to prosecute is to let the prosecuting authorities do it.
In malicious prosecution, as in slander and libel, there are cases of
mistaken identity where the defendant has had to pay. In Jones v.
Phillips Petroleum Co.,51 the defendant had obtained a judgment
against one Clarence L. Jones and garnished the salary of plaintiff,
also named Clarence L. Jones. Unfortunately the defendant had made
no investigation to make sure plaintiff was the same person against
whom the judgment had been rendered, although such an investiga-
tion if reasonably pursued might well have disclosed the difference.
The court held that under the evidence there was want of probable
cause due to proof of failure to make adequate inquiry. The defendant
raised the point that there was no evidence at all of malice, since he
was merely mistaken as to the identity of the judgment debtor in the
garnishment proceedings. But the court held that malice may be
inferred by the jury from a sufficient showing of want of probable
cause.
The most interesting cases of malicious prosecution are those which
deal with evidence. The discharge of the plaintiff or the dismissal of
the suit is evidence of malice because it is evidence of want of prob-
able cause. It is not settled whether the discharge of the plaintiff
standing alone is sufficient evidence of want of probable cause and
thus of malice. Other relevant circumstances are also admissible as
evidence of malice, for example, lack of diligence of the defendant in
making his investigation, as in the Jones case.52
Equally interesting are the cases involving evidence to rebut malice.
A valid judgment for the plaintiff in the original civil case or of
conviction in the criminal case, though subsequently reversed, is con-
49. Ibid.
50. Sappington v. Watson, 50 Mo. 83 (1872).
51. 239 Mo. App. 331, 186 S.W.2d 868 (1945).
52. La Chance v. National Pigments & Chemical Co., 104 S.W.2d 693 (Mo.
App. 1937).
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elusive evidence for the defendant, 3 except that a conviction by a
magistrate or a police judge, while it is evidence of probable cause,
is not conclusive if the plaintiff is subsequently acquitted on appeal.5'
The fact that the identity of the plaintiff was mistaken by the defen-
dant is evidence rebutting malice, though experience shows that juries
are not too inclined to let off defendants merely because they made
mistakes. A reasonable belief in the facts as justifying the prosecu-
tion is also evidence of want of malice. The commonest form of this
evidence is prior consultation with counsel, but it is available only if
counsel is given all of the facts before he renders an opinion that
prosecution is justified.'
It is easily seen from a consideration of these cases and the prin-
ciples they announce that both motive and purpose are not required
if the act is intentional and proves to be wrongful. If bad motive
or purpose is present it is important because it makes a verdict for
the plaintiff highly probable and aggravates the amount of the re-
covery, particularly where punitive damages are asked. 6
V. ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR FRAUD AND DECEIT
State of mind is also an essential element in an action for damages
for fraud and deceit, and the old word used to denote that state of
mind is "scienter." Of course the word "scienter" is just a Latin
adverb which means knowingly, and is one of the essential elements
of the cause of action. Scienter is shown where the false representa-
tion has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or reck-
lessly and without care whether it be true or false. The latter two
classes are the legal equivalent of actually knowing the falsehood and
in fact are really but one, for one who makes a statement careless
of whether it be true or false can have no real belief in the truth of
his statement.Y
Again in these cases, however, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween intent and purpose, because if the false statement is made
intentionally-that is with knowledge of its falsit-lack of a pur-
pose to cheat the plaintiff is immaterial. An excellent illustration of
this principle is the case of Bank of Atchison County v. Byers." In
that case a certain investment company which owned a large tract
of land was indebted in an amount of more than $400,000 secured
1)y a first mortgage. Desiring to refund this mortgage, it arranged
5:3. Ripley v. Bank of Skidmore, 355 Mo. 897, 198 S.W.2d 861 (1947).
54. Hanser v. Bieber, 271 Mo. 326, 197 S.W. 68 (1917).
55. Richardson v. La Font, 119 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. App. 1938); Sappington v.
Watson, 50 Mo. 83 (1872).
56. See § VI infra.
57. Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (1889).
58. 139 Mo. 627,41 S.W. 325 (1897).
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to sell a refunding mortgage bond issue through a broker named
Winner, and printed a series of bonds which were represented to be
first mortgage debenture bonds on their faces, and a mortgage was
executed to secure them. The broker did not pay for the bonds at
the time of delivery, but he was to sell the bonds and pay off the
first mortgage with the proceeds. He was unable to sell many of the
bonds, however, and the original first mortgage remained unreleased.
Plaintiff had purchased a number of the bonds, and when the property
was foreclosed under the original first mortgage, plaintiff's bonds
became worthless. The investment company and Winner became
insolvent.
The bank then brought an action for fraud and deceit against
the officers of the investment company, based on the false statement
that the bonds were first mortgage bonds. Defendants strongly urged
that they had in good faith intended to pay off the outstanding first
mortgage (which would have made the representation good) and
that they did not intend that the purchasers of the bonds should
suffer any loss. The court held that since the defendants knew the
bonds were not first mortgage bonds at the time they were issued or
at the time the plaintiff acquired them, they therefore knew that the
statement on the faces of the bonds was false. This was conclusive
proof of fraudulent intent (sometimes called scienter). The court
also quoted from a New York case"9 holding that if the necessary
consequence of a transaction is to defraud another, the transaction
is conclusive evidence of fraudulent intent, as defendant must be
presumed to have intended the necessary consequences of his own act.
In terms of our present discussion this means it is not necessary
to prove that defendant intended the loss which the plaintiff suffered
if the loss was the necessary consequence of the falsity of the repre-
sentations he made; in brief, the purpose to cause the loss or even
to deceive need not be shown, so long as the defendant intentionally
made the false statement intending that it be relied on. This is of
course thoroughly sound. If the law were otherwise, every cheat
might contend that he meant no harm or that he expected the trans-
action to turn out successfully for the plaintiff.
The converse of these propositions is likewise true, namely, that
although the defendant had a fraudulent purpose, that alone is
insufficient to impose liability if the other elements of an actionable
fraud are absent. For example, a promise to do something in the
future is not actionable fraud if it does not include any misrepresen-
59. Babcock v. Eckler, 24 N.Y. 623 (1862).
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tationk of a present fact, even though the defendant had an intention
at the time not to perform the promise.0
In fraud cases the field of circumstantial evidence reaches its fullest
development. Any statement or act of the party charged throwing
any light on the nature of the transaction involved is admissible.
For example, in a suit for fraud over the sale of bank stock induced
by a false financial statement, evidence of excessive dividends before
and the passing of the dividends after the sale, subsequent decline
ia the market value, and audits made and examined by the defendant
w\\hile he was unloading the stock, are admissible21
Transactions between the defendant and third parties are admis-
sible if they throw any light on the alleged fraud. For example, in
a suit between two brokers for the misrepresentation by the one
concerning the amount of commission to be split, correspondence
between the owners of the property and the defendant broker is
admissible to show a side agreement for a larger commission2 -
In an action for fraud over the sale of cattle, the reputation of the
herd in the neighborhood is admissible.2 Samples of other matters
which may be shown are: the value of the property and the price
at which the buyer resold it; similar contracts with others involving
the same or similar property, if they throw light on the transaction
in suit; the acts of the party charged subsequent to the deal.
One other principle of evidence should be mentioned here. In an
action at law for damages where the defendant is in a fiduciary rela-
tionship to the plaintiff and owes him a duty to disclose every material
fact, scienter of the defendant may be inferred from his failure to
make full disclosure.'
To sunnnarize: the state of mind of the defendant required in an
action for fraud and deceit, commonly called "scienter," is sufficiently
shown when it is demonstrated that defendant intentionally made the
false statements intending them to be relied upon. That is fraud
even though he had no evil purpose or motive. Of course it frequently
is shown that defendant intended to cheat the plaintiff-that is, his
purpose was to cheat-and if it is, so much better for the plaintiff.
Here again intent is the important element, rather than purpose or
motive.
('0. Reed v. Cooke, 331 Mo. 507, 55 S.W.2d 275 (1932).
The scope of this article is limited to the legal action of damages for deceit.
In some equitable actions scienter is not required. See 3 POmMEROY, EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE §§ 885-89 (5th ed. 1941).
61. Morrow v. Franklin, 289 Mo. 549, 233 S.W. 224 (1921).
62, Sawyer v. Walker, 204 Mo. 133, 102 S.W. 544 (1907).
63. Conley v. Kaney, 250 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. 1952).
C4, Klika v. Albert Wenzlick Real Estate Co., 150 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. App. 1941).
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VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Where punitive damages are asked, the state of mind of defendant
is the only issue. The purpose of the award of such damages is to
punish the defendant for his wilful, wanton or malicious conduct.
The question is, therefore, what is the meaning of the word "malice"
as a requirement for punishing the defendant? What must the jury
find his state of mind to have been? One might assume that here at
last actual malice, ill-will or purpose to injure must be present, but
this is not the law. Even though the award of exemplary damages
is punitive in purpose, and even though the courts say defendant's
act must have been wilful, wanton or malicious, when the Missouri
courts define malice for the purpose of punitive damages, they come
back to the same definition applied in the case of compensatory dam-
ages. All that is required is "legal" malice to justify an award of
punitive damages. In the leading case of Lampert v. Judge & Dolph
Drug Co.,6 the plaintiff manufactured and sold cigars under the
trade-name Flor de Lampert. These cigars had a reputation for qual-
ity and their sale was profitable. Plaintiff sold the defendant drug
company its cigar to be resold at retail. A clerk substituted inferior
cigars in the box bearing plaintiff's trade-mark and sold them as
plaintiff's cigars, a violation of the federal revenue laws for which
the clerk was convicted. There was no evidence that any officer or
employee of the defendant, excepting the guilty clerk, had any knowl-
edge of the fraud. The trial court instructed the jury that if it
believed defendant had wilfully and maliciously sold cigars not manu-
factured by plaintiff from boxes having his trade-mark thereon and
awarded plaintiff actual damages in any sum whatever, it might also
award such further sum by way of punitive damages as it believed
defendant ought to pay. The court also instructed the jury that
malice is the wilful and intentional doing of a wrongful act without
legal justification or excuse. The jury awarded the plaintiff $1 actual
damages and $500 punitive damages. The supreme court affirmed the
awards, holding that only legal malice was required as a basis for
punitive damages. The court quoted from McNamara v. St. Louis
Transit Co. 66
The average layman would believe that "malicious" means ill
will; spite; hostility towards the other party. This is not the
legal meaning. Those feelings may or may not be present in the
legal meaning of the term. The legal meaning of the term is "the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or ex-
cuse.
6 7
65. 238 Mo. 409, 141 S.W. 1095 (1911).
66. 182 Mo. 676, 81 S.W. 880 (1904).
67. 238 Mo. at 419, 141 S.W. at 1098; accord, Patrick v. Employers Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co., 233 Mo. App. 251, 118 S.W.2d 116 (1938).
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However, while the courts define the word "malice" in connection
with the right to recover punitive damages in the same words in
which they define it for the purpose of recovering compensatory dam-
ages, they sometimes make one point of difference. The phrase "the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse" is
ambiguous. Does it mean merely that the act was done intentionally
and proves to be wrongful, or does it mean that the actor, in doing
the act, knew that it was wrongful? As we have seen from prior
discussion of the law of slander and libel and malicious prosecution,
guilty knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act is not required in
the case of compensatory damages. However, there is a line of cases
in which the courts, while approving instructions to the jury in the
same language, have refused to allow punitive damages unless there
was evidence that the defendant knew that his act was wrongful05
This is sound, because a defendant should not be punished for his act
unless he knew it was wrong. There is a modification of the rule
where the defendant's conduct so recklessly and wantonly disregards
plaintiff's rights that the law will imply the intention.2
The courts have encountered difficulty in mistaken identity cases
where there is no evidence of actual malice and no evidence of knowl-
edge by the defendant that his act was wrongful, and their treatment
of the problem has not been consistent. The case of Byrne v. News
(Corp.,7 involved a libelous publication where the person alluded to
was not named at all; the suit arose out of the publication by the
newspaper of a letter to the editor containing the libelous statements
made by the other defendant. It was conceded that there was no
actual malice on the part of the newspaper although there was evi-
dence tending to show malice on the part of the letterwriter. The
court refused the newspaper's requested instruction that if the publi-
cation by the newspaper was not actuated by any malice whatever,
but made in good faith, believing it to be true, the jury should not
find any punitive damages against the newspaper. The court of
appeals affirmed the jury's verdict awarding both actual and punitive
damages, holding that whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions,
thc rule in Missouri is that a jury may award punitive damages based
merely on malice implied by law, and it is not required to find actual
or express malice.
In .fones v. Phillips Petrolezu Co. the jury awarded both compen-
satory and punitive damages. That was the case of mistaken identity
68. McNamara v. St. Louis Transit Co., 182 Mo. 676, 81 S.W. 880 (1904);
Hall v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 224 Mo. App. 431, 28 S.W.2d 687 (1930); Bean v.
Branson, 217 Mo. App. 399, 266 S.W. 743 (1924) ; Custer v. Kroeger, 209 Mo. App.
450, 240 S.W. 241 (1922).
69. Reel v. Consolidated Inv. Co., 295 Mo. 466, 236 S.W. 43 (1921).
70. 195 Mo. App. 265, 190 S.W. 933 (1916).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of the debtor in a garnishment proceeding. The defendant on appeal
contended that there is a difference between the character of malice
to be inferred from the want of probable cause (which was the only
evidence of malice in the case) and the kind necessary to support a
verdict for punitive damages. The court said that there were cases
holding that the character of malice that may be inferred from lack
of probable cause will support a finding for punitive damages and
there were cases to the contrary. The court, however, sustained the
verdict on the ground that there was evidence of conduct showing a
reckless and wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights, equivalent to
actual malice.
In the case of Coats v. News Corp., a case of mistaken identity, the
court said that there was no evidence of actual malice and the award
of $1 punitive damages showed that the jury found nothing more
than legal malice, that it is not necessary to find actual malice to
support and award of substantial punitive damages, and that the
giving of punitive damages as well as the amount lies wholly within
the discretion of the jury. The last statement in the opinion assumes,
of course, that there is evidence on which to base punitive damages.
A very interesting case differentiating liability for punitive dam-
ages from liability for compensatory damages is the recent case of
Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co.71 In that case the plaintiff company had
been insured against public liability by the defendant insurance com-
pany. The plaintiff had been sued on account of a personal injury
arising from an accident covered by defendant's policy. The plaintiff
therein had asked for $40,000 damages; the policy limit was $10,000.
While this first suit was pending, negotiations for settlement were
carried on between counsel for the injured plaintiff and the insur-
ance company, during which it was suggested that the suit could be
settled within the policy limits if the Zumwalt Company would con-
tribute to the settlement, but the Zumwalt Company refused to do
this. The first trial of the personal injury case resulted in a mistrial
and the second in a hung jury. The third trial resulted in a verdict
for plaintiff of $15,000, and the Zumwalt Company had to pay $5,000
with interest. After reviewing cases on the liability of an insurance
carrier under these circumstances, the supreme court held that the
basis of liability of the insurance company for refusing to settle a
claim within the limits of a policy is not negligence but bad faith.
Bad faith, being a state of mind, is provable by circumstantial evi-
dence as well as by direct evidence, and consists of the intentional
disregard of the financial interest of the insured in the hope of escap-
ing responsibility imposed on it by the policy. The court further said
71. 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950).
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that there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that the
reason defendant did not settle the personal injury suit was that
under no circumstances would it be liable for more than $5,000 (it
had reinsured half the liability) and it could gamble on getting a
favorable verdict rather than making a settlement within the limits
of the policy. The court held such action was not good faith and that
the trial court properly over-ruled defendant's motion for a directed
ver'dict.
The trial court had, however, refused instructions authorizing puni-
tive damages, and the supreme court affirmed that refusal, stating
that before punitive damages can be awarded there must be evidence
to shov that the defendant maliciously, wilfully, intentionally or
recklessly injured the plaintiff, and that there was no evidence in
this case that would warrant such submission. The most that could
be said of the evidence, the court stated, was that defendant did not
act in good faith in handling the case and looked after its own inter-
ests only, while it was bound to sacrifice its interests in favor of those
of the insured, but that this was not maliciously, wilfully, intentionally
,,r recklessly inflicting injury upon its insured. The supreme court
stated that since this was not a case of negligence, the cases that
allow punitive damages in that field are of little value, and then cited
Staofe 'el. Kira r. Hugkt's, ' for the proposition that there must
I)e evidence of malicious, wilful, reckless or intentional injury. The
Kit n case, however, was a negligence case holding that a railroad's
failure to maintain a watchman or automatic signals at a grade
crossing did not subject it to punitive damages.
The interesting thing about the Zumi walt case is that after holding
that there was evidence of bad faith, justifying compensatory dam-
ages, the court held that there was no evidence of malicious, wilful
or intentional injury. Under the definition of malice as the inten-
tional doing of a wrongful act without justification or legal excuse,
the court could easily have decided that the bad faith of the insur-
ance company in gambling at the expense of its own insured was
malicious. It could even have found malice under that interpretation
of the rule requiring that defendant know he was doing a wrongful
act. The insurance company and its lawyers certainly knew what they
were doing.
In its result the decision was right. It would have been unjust to
punish the insurance company for refusing to settle within the policy
limits when it took three trials to determine the liability in excess of
the policy limits. Courts are seeking to do justice in the cases before
thc m; the difficulty arises when the established rules of law and of
72. 348 Mo. 177, 153 S.WV.2d 46 (1941).
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decision do not fit the facts of the particular case. The courts, how-
ever, often apply verbally the rules previously established but with a
changed meaning, although they do not admit the change. The Mis-
souri cases are in confusion as to what, if any, malice is required to
authorize the recovery of punitive damages. The courts define malice
for this purpose in the same language that they define malice for
compensatory damages; one line of cases says, however, that the
defendant must have known that he was doing something wrongful.
Some cases hold that malice may be inferred from lack of probable
cause for purposes of punitive damages as well as actual damages;
others say that there must be express malice shown; others require
only legal malice.
It'is submitted that the courts should and do exercise some discre-
tion in deciding whether or not the defendant should be subjected to
punitive damages. It would be better to frankly establish such a rule.
VII. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
The statutory provisions defining fraudulent conveyances are sec-
tions 428.020 and 428.010 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.
Sec. 428.020 Conveyances to defraud creditors, void.-Every
conveyance or assignment in writing, or otherwise, of any estate
or interest in lands, or in goods and chattels, or in things in
action, or of any rents and profits issuing therefrom, and every
charge upon lands, goods or things in action, or upon the rents
and profits thereof, and every bond, suit judgment, decree or
execution, made or contrived with the intent to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors of their lawful actions, damages, forfeitures,
debts or demands, or to defraud or deceive those who shall pur-
chase the same lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any rent,
profit or commodity issuing out of them, shall be from hence-
forth deemed and taken, as against said creditors and purchasers,
prior and subsequent, to be clearly and utterly void.
Sec. 428.010 Gift in trust for benefit of donor void as to creditors.
-Every deed of gift and conveyance of goods and chattels, in
trust, to the use of the person so making such deed of gift or
conveyance, is declared to be void as against creditors, existing
and subsequent, and purchasers.
We have quoted and will refer to section 428.020 first because it is
the more important and it requires the existence of a state of mind
in the grantor and, in some cases, also in the grantee.
The statute requires the conveyance to have been made or con-
trived with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or purchasers
and makes void all conveyances with such intent. The word used in
the statute is "intent." In accordance with the nomenclature which
we have suggested in this article for purposes of analysis, this is
really purpose. Every competent adult person acts intentionally when
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss3/2
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he makes a conveyance, but the statute invalidates only those convey-
ances which are made with the purpose of hindering, delaying or
defrauding creditors or defrauding or deceiving purchasers. In the
language of the statute, the intent to hinder, delay or defraud cred-
itors or purchasers is made the gist of the action.
Here again, as to existing creditors, an actual purpose to hinder,
delay or defraud is not necessary if that is the necessary result of
the conveyance.- This is really another example of our main thesis
that the important element is intent and not purpose. If the grantor
intentionally executes a conveyance which renders him insolvent and
does in fact hinder and delay creditors, the fact that such result was
not his purpose will not aid the conveyance. The courts sometimes
say it is fraudulent in fact in the sense that it has the effect of hinder-
ing and delaying creditors. Once more motive and purpose are less
important than intent.
The rule is different, however, as to future creditors. Even though
the conveyance does result in hindering, delaying or defrauding
future creditors, if the grantor is not indebted at the time of the con-
veyance it must be shown the conveyance was made in contemplation
of incurring future debts whose holders would be hindered or de-
frauded. Here true purpose is required; the purpose to defraud fu-
ture creditors."
The statute is silent as to whose intent is required. Of course the
grantor must have the requisite intent-but what about the grantee?
It is well settled that innocent purchasers for value are not subject
to the statute.:' However, conveyances to volunteer purchasers (other
than creditors) are void under the statute if the grantee has actual
knowledge of the fraud and participates in the fraudulent purpose
with intent to assist in it, o even though he paid full value.7  Notice
of facts -ufficient to put a reasonable man upon inquiry is not suffi-
cient since actual knowledge and participation in the fraudulent pur-
pose are required, However, notice of such facts is evidence from
which a jury may find actual knowledge."- There is no dispute as to
this, rule and it has been frequently applied, particularly in cases
where grantees were members of the grantor's family. Courts have
readlily found a purpose of assisting in the fraud even though the
7.. McCuer v. White, 338 Mo. 1017, 93 S.W.2d 696 (1936); Snyder v. Free,
114 Mo. 360,21 S.W. 847 (1893).
74. Stierlin v. Teschemacher, 333 Mo. 1208, 64 S.W.2d 647 (1933); Coleman v.
Hagey, 252 Mo. 102, 158 S.W. 829 (1913); Kinealy v. Macldin, 89 Mo. 433, 14
S.W. 507 (1886).
75. Van Raalte v. Harrington, 101 Mo. 602, 14 S.W. 710 (1890).
76. Ibid.
77. Barber v. Nunn, 275 Mo. 565, 205 S.W. 14 (1918).
78. Van Raalte v. Harrington, 101 Mo. 602, 14 S.W. 710 (1890).
79. Ibid.
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grantee gave adequate consideration since, as we shall see, a family
relationship along with other circumstances is evidence of fraud not
only by the grantor but also by the grantee.
But there is more difficulty in the cases where unrelated third
parties with no motive of family relationship put out good, new
money for property, or personally assume the liabilities of the grantor
in an adequate amount. Has such grantee participated in the fraudu-
lent act? In many such cases the only evidence of his participation is
mere knowledge of the fraudulent purpose of the grantor. The cases
are conflicting as to whether this is sufficient evidence of participa-
tion. 0
One thing is clear. It is unwise to purchase property-even for its
fair value-from an insolvent debtor unless, as we shall see in a
moment, the proceeds all go to the payment of his debts. From knowl-
edge of his insolvency the court or jury may infer participation in the
fraudulent purpose, even if the purchaser's motive is, let us say, to
acquire a home for himself. He is likely to have trouble if the seller
is insolvent and he knows it.
In defining this doctrine, however, the courts ran into another well
established rule, namely, that an insolvent debtor has the right at
common law to prefer one creditor over another. Therefore a creditor
taking payment or conveyance of property at a fair price or as secu-
rity for his claim has a valid assignment at common law, even though
he knows other creditors will be defrauded thereby, if he does nothing
more than protect himself.81 Hence if the grantee is a creditor and
accepts payment, or if he is unsecured and accepts security for the
purpose of protecting his own interest as creditor, his knowledge of
the grantor's insolvency will not avoid the payment or the transfer
although the grantor intends thereby to hinder or defraud his other
creditors, and the acceptance of the transfer helps him do it. This
is an exception to the rule that knowledge of or participation in
the fraudulent purpose will avoid the transfer. This exception is
sound and is another example of the general principle that a lawful
act is not actionable by reason of bad motive or purpose. The law
thus makes important distinctions between volunteer purchasers and
creditors. 2
What has been said as to the requirement of knowledge on the part
:f the grantee has no application to voluntary conveyances without
80. See Barber v. Nunn, 275 Mo. 565, 205 S.W. 14 (1918); Farmers' Bank v.
Eandly, 320 Mo. 754, 9 S.W.2d 880 (1928); Citizens' Bank v. McElvain, 280 Mo.
505, 219 S.W. 75 (1919).
81. Peoples Bank v. Jones, 338 Mo. 1048, 93 S.W.2d 903 (1936).
82. We are not considering here the modification of the common law rule by
the Bankruptcy Act which renders voidable transfers within four months of
bankruptcy to creditors who have actual knowledge or reason to know that the
transferor is insolvent.
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valuable consideration. In those cases neither knowledge of, nor
participation in, the grantor's fraudulent intent is required of the
grantee. The conveyance will be set aside on proof of the grantor's
fraud.1' ,
Questions of fraudulent purpose or intent are to be determined
under the circumstances existing at the time of the conveyance8 In
McCluer v. White it was held that a voluntary conveyance by a
mother to her children, not fraudulently made at the time, could not
be set aside by reason of her subsequent bankruptcy as a result of the
depression. The value of her property was ample at the time she
made the conveyance. In Hartman v. Lauchli- the court held that
the trustee in bankruptcy could not recover payments made when the
bankrupt owed no debts, in the absence of affirmative proof that he
contemplated defrauding future creditors at the time the payments
were made. The particular point and the ruling made was that liabil-
ity for income taxes does not become a debt of the taxpayer until the
date the following year when the return is due and that subsequent
assessments of deficiencies relate back to that date, but no farther.
However, a deed not fraudulent when executed and delivered, may
become so by being unrecorded and concealed.37
As in other fraud cases, fraudulent purpose can seldom be shown
by direct evidence, but it frequently is shown by circumstantial evi-
dence. One of the commonest evidences of fraud is family relation-
ship between grantor and grantee. , Other common badges of fraud
are: statements of fictitious consideration in the deed; transactions
out of the ordinary course of business, such as bulk sales; large credit
purchases shortly prior to the conveyance; the amount of the property
conveyed in relation to the grantor's total means; the time of the
transfer in relation to the bringing of suit or levy of execution; with-
holding conveyance from the record;"' false statements to a credit
agency ;", continued possession of land after the date of the deed and
predating the deed;", and of course failure of the grantee to testify.
On the other hand, circumstances rebutting fraud are: solvency
at the time; subsequent payment of debts; adequate security for
existing debts; retention of adequate means to pay existing debts;
83. Conrad v. Diehl, 344 Mo. 811, 129 S.W.2d 870 (1939).
84. MeCluer v. White, 338 Mo. 1017, 93 S.W.2d 696 (1936); Hartman v.
Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1956).
85. 338 Mo. 1017, 93 S.W.2d 696 (1936).
86. 238 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1956).
87. Goldsby v. Johnson, 82 Mo. 602 (1884).
88. Hendrix v. Goldman, 92 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1936); Stahihuth v. Nagle, 229
Mo. 570, 129 S.W. 687 (1910).
89. Castorina v. Herrmann, 340 Mo. 1026, 104 S.W.2d 297 (1937); Hendrix v.
Goldman, supra note 88; Brown v. Oehler, 192 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. App. 1946).
90. Kramer v. Wilson, 22 Mo. App. 173 (1886).
91. Barber v. Nunn, 275 Mo. 565, 205 S.W. 14 (1918).
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reasonableness of the gift; subsequent depreciation in the values of
the property; 92 and adequacy of consideration and application of the
proceeds to the seller's debts, which is evidence of lack of fraud as
well as an absolute defense.93
VIII. CONCLUSION
Consideration of the foregoing propositions and cases leads to the
conclusion stated at the outset: that purpose and motive, though fre-
quently important in proving malice, fraud, etc., are not usually
essential if intent be present. The intentional doing of the act entails
the legal consequences, no matter how innocent the purpose or motive.
This terminology is not adhered to by courts or legislators and con-
fusion frequently results therefrom, but the distinctions suggested in
this article may be helpful in understanding and bringing order out
of the confusion.
92. M cCluer v. White, 338 Mo. 1017, 93 S.W.2d 696 (1936).
93. Ryan v. Young, 79 Mo. 30 (1883).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss3/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
Volume 1957 June 1957 Number 3
Edited by the Undergraduates of Washington University School of Law, St. Louis.
Published in February, April, June, and December at
Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
EDITORIAL BOARD
DOMINIc TROIANI, Editor-in-Chief
RONALD M. BELT W. LAYTON STEWART
Associate Editor Associate Editor
JAMES L. VIANI S. SHELDON WEINHAUS
Associate Editor Associate Editor
JEROLD B. KATZ, Business Manager
STAFF
JULES B. GERARD GERHARD J. PETZALL
MARTIN SCHIFF, JR.
Azsi ant Business Managers
ALBERT J. HALLEr EARL TEDROW
FACULTY ADVISOR
WILLIAM E. WALLACE
ADVISORY BOARD
C HAfRLES, C. ALLEN III
ROBERT L. ARONSON
FRANK P. ASCHEMEYER
EDWARD BEIMFOHR
G. A. BUDER, JR.
RicuRD S. BULL
REXFORD H. CARUTHERS
DANE L. CORNFELD
SAM ELSON
ARTHUR J. FREUND
WARNER FULLER
JOSEPTI J. GRAVELY
JOHN RAEBURN GREEN
FORREST M. HEsIKER
GEORGE A. JENSEN
LLOYD R. KOENIG
ALAN C. KOHN
HARRY W. KROEGER
FRED L. KUHLMANN
WARREN R. MAICHEL
DAVID L. MILLAR
Ross E. MORRIS
RALPH R. NEUHOFF
NORMNAN C. PARKER
CHRISTIAN B. PEPER
ORVILLE RICHARDSON
W. MUNRO ROBERTS
STANLEY M. ROSENBLUM
A. E. S. ScHxmr
EDWIN M. SCHAEFER, JR.
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS
KARL P. SPENCER
MAURICE L. STEWART
JOHN R. STOCKHAM%
VAYNE B. WRIGHT
Subscription Price $4.00; Per Current Copy $1.25. A subscriber desiring to
discontinue his subscription should send notice to that effect. In the absence of
such notice, the subscription will be continued.
Washington University Open Scholarship
CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
ALLAN D. VESTAL-Associate Professor of Law, College of Law,
State University of Iowa. A.B. 1943, DePauw University; LL.B.
1949, Yale Law School. Member of the Iowa Bar.
CHARLES CLAFLIN ALLEN-Senior partner, Allen & Allen; A.B.
1915, Princeton University; LL.B. 1921, St. Louis University. Mem-
ber of the Missouri Bar.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss3/2
